Editor’s Note: We are publishing this morning from St. Louis, where the annual Department of Defense Intelligence Information Systems (DoDIIS) conference is being held at the convention center. Travel and flight arrangements were great, (“Saint Louis in August!”) though our arrival seemed to catch the hosting hotel- I won’t defame it by name- completely by surprise. Traveling downtown in the cab, we passed the exit for Ferguson, flashpoint for some previous violence and making me think of the vehicular attack on Antifa counter-protestors to a alt-right demonstration about the preservation of a century old statue of Robert E. Lee in Charlottesville, VA, 41 miles south of Refuge Farm. With the specter of war looming elsewhere, Arrias presciently talks about an issue that has both international and domestic implications.
– Vic
Herman Kahn, Captain Kirk, and Kim Jong Un
Herman Kahn, the 20th Century Strategist, in his work “On Escalation” introduced the concept of an “escalation ladder,” which began with various political acts and escalated – if unchecked – to nuclear attacks on each other’s cities. 52 years later the “ladder” remains valuable in understanding how a crisis might develop. But it contains a fascinating warning; in his own discussion of the defects in his metaphor, Kahn referenced the game of “Chicken,” noting: “This is a game in which it is usually better to be opposed by a good player than a poor one!”
His point is obvious: the poor player won’t know when to veer to the side.
Which brings us to Captain Kirk. In the episode “A Taste of Armageddon,” Kirk encountered two planets engaged in a centuries-long war in which, in order to prevent the devastation and horror that accompanies war, attacks were computer simulated, and casualties identified, and then those named were directed to report for – real – execution by their own government.
This kept the war from “destroying” their society.
It also, as Kirk noted, kept them from a meaningful understanding of the horrors of war, or a reason to end it. As Kahn might say, the leaders of these two planets were poor players of the game.
Consider this: last week was the 72nd anniversary of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (06 and 09 August 1945).
In two invasions immediately prior to the bombings – Iwo Jima and Okinawa – the Japanese army had simply refused to surrender. On Iwo Jima 99% of the Japanese forces were killed. On Okinawa the numbers were slightly better: between 10-14% surrendered. Additionally, on Okinawa between 25 – 35% of the civilians died. Compared to other wars and other battles, these numbers are incomprehensible.
This led US Army planners to forecast monstrous losses in any invasion of Japan — for the US it would mean many more casualties than we’d already suffered in 4 years of war; for the Japanese it would mean a minimum of several million more dead, and an utterly destroyed society.
The atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki thus became the best of a number of very harsh options. For the Emperor, they represented one final opportunity to “veer” out of the way.
War is hell, as Gen. Sherman observed. But sometimes it’s the only option. And once started, what was once unthinkable may, in fact, become the best path ahead.
The horror of war should keep us from choosing that path until it’s truly the only option. The North Koreans – and the Chinese – need to remember that as we try to deal with this current crisis; and prevent a worse future crisis.
In short, neither try to make war antiseptic, nor couch your diplomacy in terms that downplay what might happen.
So, if it’s acceptable that our “near future” (perhaps 10 years) includes a North Korea with 100 or more nuclear weapons, and perhaps 20 or 30 ICBMs and 50 intermediate ranged missiles that can target Japan and Guam, than we must simply talk our way past this current situation; kick the can down the road.
But if the thought that North Korea will soon possess a capable nuclear arsenal is terrifying and unacceptable, than we need to apply pressure now to prevent that future. That entails risk. But that risk now may well be one we need to accept in order to prevent a far worse future.
This leads us to Kim Jong Un. We mustn’t confuse ourselves and believe he’s stupid; he isn’t. But he may well be misinformed, and he almost certainly doesn’t understand what he’s facing in the US nuclear arsenal. He is, to return to Kahn’s warning, probably a poor player of this game of nuclear chicken.
So, what might we do?
From the military perspective it would seem we’re prepared.
Diplomatically it appears our key allies are “in synch” with our efforts.
China continues to play it’s own game – and will. We should tell them that, as the key enabler of the North Korean nuclear weapons program, we hold them in large part responsible for this mess and any possible outcome.
But finally, we need someone the North trusts to go to Pyongyang and explain to them what really happens if they fire one nuclear weapon at US territory.
Kim needs to understand just how this particular game of chicken can end.
Copyright 2017 Arrias
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