Since 2015 Senators McCain and Graham have called for more US troops in Syria. First they called for 10,000 troops, then 20,000 and then 50,000. Now, the numbers have climbed to 150,000.
To be clear, this isn’t about the additional troops Secretary Mattis sent into Iraq and Syria (or into Afghanistan); Secretary Mattis has clear, limited goals in Syria and Northern Iraq – working with Kurds et al to destroy ISIS, and it won’t require 10,000 more troops. Though, there’s a cautionary note: no one can fully account for everything in war. General Maxwell Taylor was adamant he understood exactly what was happening in Vietnam — until suddenly he didn’t.
(Consider, as US presence in Afghanistan moves toward its 16th year, we not only see Taliban endurance and Al Qaeda resilience, we now have Chinese army patrols in the Wakhan corridor in eastern Afghanistan…)
So, if these two Senators want many more troops in Syrian, a few questions need answers.
First: what’s their desired end state? Defeating ISIS isn’t enough; ISIS will be defeated. Then what? Which fanatical Jihadists replace them is unknown, but one will emerge. Meanwhile, presumably, the large US presence in Syria would remain to stabilize northern Iraq and northeast Syria, and engage in nation-building.
Nation-building has a bad reputation, and should: it’s exceptionally difficult. Advocates point to Europe and the Marshall Plan as proof it’s possible. But Europe in 1945 was different: populations were highly literate, there were strong common social and political ties to western thought, and democracy had strong roots (even Germany, emerging from 12 years of Nazi rule, had been a constitutional monarchy for 100 years).
Japan was different, but the Japanese “renaissance” (the Meiji Restoration of 1867) adopted many of the forms and mores of European (and particularly British) society. And, in all cases, social standards meant that virtually the entire population accepted the surrender. There were no insurgencies, and there was little organized crime or violence directed at the US; the people acquiesced in the surrender and were willing to obey and take direction.
And, these countries (and Korea in 1953) had suffered massive destruction during WWII. Rebuilding was imperative; there would’ve been no survival for much of the population if the nation-building had not been thoroughly embraced by the people.
In short, these countries were ideal for nation-building.
Yet it still took several decades for these societies, operating with substantial US presence, to re-emerge as fully functioning societies. Japan, which recovered most rapidly, was fully functioning just a decade after the war’s end. But, Japan benefited from having 1/3rd the casualties Germany had, as well as having an extremely homogenous population with a high degree of national cohesion.
How does that compare to Iraq or Syria? Iraq has three major populations: Shia Arabs, Sunni Arabs, and Kurds. Shia Arabs – closely tied to Iran – constitute perhaps 60% of the population, Sunni Arabs 20%, and Kurds 15%. Just the Sunni – Shia spilt, the great fault line in the Islamic world, makes nation-building difficult to imagine. Additionally, the Kurds have viewed themselves as separate from the rest of the Arab world for 1,000 years. Any plan must address the growing Kurdish identity and it’s impact on power-hungry President Erdogan in Turkey.
And Syria? Do the senators envision “solving” the Syrian problem, of forcing Assad to leave? Or would they call for partitioning Syria despite Russian presence and support for Assad? What cost are the Senators willing to pay for that?
Syria is the antithesis of a cohesive population – Syrian Arabs, Palestinians, Kurds, Turks, Assyrians, Armenians; 74% Sunni, 13% Shia, 10% Christian, 3% Druze. Some argue that only a dictator could unify Syria. Perhaps not. But nation-building wouldn’t be easy.
Before the US precipitously left Iraq in 2011, before Iran moved forces into both countries in 2013, before Russia returned to Syria in 2015, this might have been conceivable, if we’d had a clear end state that made sense. But now, both Russian and Iranian forces are present in significant numbers, and Assad’s survival appears quite certain.
So exactly what achievable, desired end state justifies tens of thousands of US troops?
Syria is in a horrible condition. But rushing in without first answering some hard questions would only make it worse. Let’s be clear on what we expect, what costs we are willing to pay, what risks we’ll accept, and exactly how all this will benefit the US before we go any further.
Copyright 2017 Arrias
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