The Giants won the world series and there was widespread rioting. I missed that part, but it was a grand series for a change. I got wrapped up in some hazy memories about organizing the Pariah States Cool Hotels tour for Congressman Bill. The agony of the details and preparation had faded- the hotels were grand, securing tickets and visas from militantly hostile states was interesting.
Still, that is what we did for a living. I got a fabulous account of the first Navy visit to Shanghai since 1949 yesterday which we will get to this week, and while we have been concentrating on Africa and Iran and Asia for the last string of tales, it is worth some other ruminations on how complicated the art of conflict is, and perhaps shed some light on how your taxpayer-funded elements of military-politico affairs are actually conducted.
The following report is from one of the last Staff Delegations I managed, this one not to the troubled island of Hispaniola, nor the exotic Far East, but to the European Theater, where war raged in the Balkans.
Forgot that one? Yeah, me too, mostly. But planning and execution are just two of the three elements. Someone has to take the notes and write the after-action report. This popped up in the course of looking for something else. I am not going to put the pictures with it- I think there is a bundle of them that we took on the trip, but they probably perished in the several moves since. There were none in the original report, so you are going to get it the same way the Congress of the United States got it, unclassified, un-illustrated, and with issues that really didn’t mean much in the long haul about a conflict that is even more forgotten than The Forgotten War in Korea.
Here goes- it is best read swiftly, since it is about motion, and dragging bags.
Vic
May 1, 1995
LA-52
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL Trip to EUCOM and Balkans
1. Executive Summary: Between 06 and 14 April, a Senate Staff Delegation headed by Mr. Pete Dorn, and Gary Reese of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence conducted an examination of intelligence support to Joint Task Force PROVIDE PROMISE in the former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Mr. Dorn and Mr. Reese are monitors of the GDIP and TIARA accounts, respectively, and are thus responsible for funding all levels of military intelligence from national-to-tactical levels. Prior to departure, Mr. Dorn visited Washington-Area Service and Joint Staff offices with cognizance for collection architecture and current intelligence to examine the National component of the intelligence flow. In Theater, the USEUCOM J2 coordinated the gathering of virtually all intelligence commands from the component and Combat Support Agency perspective. Additional visits were conducted with the Chiefs of Station in Germany and Italy to examine the CIA component of the intelligence collection posture. After this Theater-level round of meetings, the STAFFDEL proceeded to AFSOUTH HQ in Naples, where discussions were held with key personnel in the JTF and the Joint Intelligence Center. The intelligence effort appeared focused and well-managed; however, at the next level of Balkan operations, DENY FLIGHT at Vincenza, IT, it appeared that personnel turbulence and connectivity issues hampered the smooth coordination and dissemination of tactically-relevant intelligence to aircrews. A Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) roll-away terminal appeared under-utilized and not integrated into the watch center structure. In marked contrast was the organization of the JTF-Forward located at Zagreb, Croatia. The intelligence mission was well-focused, studious efforts were made to prevent mission -creep and moral appeared high. Additionally, in-depth discussions with Central Intelligence Chiefs-of-Station and case-officers were conducted at every opportunity to assess HUMINT effectiveness and integration of military resources into a coherent and effective collection team.
2. Members of the Delegation:
MR Peter Dorn, PSM/SSCI (GDIP Monitor)
MR Gary Reese, PSM/SSCI (TIARA/JMIP Monitor)
MR Robert Winchester, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army/LA (Executive Agent)
CDR Victor Socotra, Navy OLA-52
CDR Terry Roberts, DMI Staff
CDR Dennis Priccolo, USEUCOM Intelligence Architecture Officer
3. 6-7 APR. The delegation departed Dulles International under sunny skies via United Airlines flight to Frankfurt, GE, for further transportation to Stuttgart, home of the Headquarters of the U.S. European Command. Escort services were provided at Frankfurt and CDR Dennis Priccolo, EUCOM Intelligence Architecture Officer, greeted the group upon arrival at Stuttgart. After check-in at the BOQ at Patch Barracks, physical training was conducted with the Special Operations Command representative. Principals dined with BG Mike Hayden at the CINC’s mess while escorts held informal meetings with Lt Col K.C. Thompson and CDR Priccolo. Upon conclusion of the luncheons, General Hayden greeted the delegation in the J2 SCIF for an afternoon symposium and round table discussion discussions were conducted with representatives of virtually every European -area command with significant intelligence resources. This approach saved a vast amount of time and effort on the part of the delegation by eliminating most short-haul travel requirements to meet resource claimants.
Mr. Dorn gave a brief introduction on the nature of Intelligence as Force Multiplier, and the concept that reductions in operational force structure did not necessarily mandate a reduction in intelligence resources. BG Hayden then provided a concise but thorough appreciation on the Balkan crisis, from its origin as the juncture of the cultural tectonic plate between Christendom and Islam, Europe and Asia to the current status. The critical element that he sought to convey was the notion that there were no “white hats” in the conflict. Each faction has atrocities for which it must answer, the only difference occasionally being in the degree. In this regard EUCOM stood in respectful but adamant disagreement with the State Department. In this context, selected systems briefings were given on national and theater level systems such as JWICS, the Linked Operations Centers- Europe (LOCE) system and the results of the first series of Unmanned Autonomous Vehicles (UAV’s) which had completed operations late last year. In response to questions on funding sources for some of these systems, General Hayden responded that to a large degree the program elements were (or should be) transparent to the operators. The CINC didn’t care who paid, just so long as someone did. This may have a role in the apparent dis-function of the JWICS roll-away unit at the Air Component of the JTF at Vincenza, IT. The day concluded with a no-host dinner at a local gasthaus that featured traditional German cuisine in a delightful secluded venue. The relaxed atmosphere facilitated frank discussions with the representatives from the commands.
4. The next morning commenced with a thirty-minute jog through the chill of the pre-dawn Patch Barracks darkness. The theme for the Saturday morning meetings was to give each of the commands and services a half-hour face to face with the delegation to allow them to address their issues apart from the round-table forum. This approach was intended to promote the greatest candor and in fact proved very effective and provoked candid discussion.
5. USAREUR AND 66TH MI BRIGADE. First up was the Theater Army component level, represented by COL Terry Ford, USAREUR and COL Steve Argersinger, 66th MI Brigade at Augsburg. Both agreed that the capability to perform their mission had been degraded significantly. One of the ongoing themes of the visit was consolidation of intelligence resources. In regard to the UCIRF, the reluctant consensus was that there was the possibility that the facility could become a subset or Detachment of the JAC. This philosophic approach was similar to that articulated by the Navy component representative in regard to FOSIF Rota.
6. USAREUR COMBAT INTELLIGENCE READINESS FACILITY (UCIRF). According to the Command focus, the UCIRF is focused on ground intelligence issues in the USAREUR area of interest, is integrated with the JAC and NATO elements and serves as the base of intelligence power projection for the Army. In that regard, the watch floor is responsible for the national data base on Bosnia (supporting operations PROVIDE PROMISE and ABLE SENTRY), and the humanitarian relief operations in Rwanda. Additional missions include force protection assessments against potential terrorists in the Theater. The unique support streams which the UCIRF provides includes ground order of battle, terrain/mobility studies, and graphic situational depictions from the Warrior intelligence support system. Although the UCIRF occupies the building of Field Station Augsburg, the resources devoted to the national collection mission have been dramatically reduced. Additional systems organic to the UCIRF include:
– The Deployable Communications and Applications Shelter
– Deployable Intelligence Support Element (DISE) (robust automation and communications capabilities)
– Mini-DISE (Collateral laptop ASAS-Warrior with SATCOM)
– FAST (Forward Area Secondary Imagery Dissemination and TRAP)
– LOCE (Linked Operations-Intelligence Centers Europe)
– TROJAN SPIRIT (Special Purpose Remote Intelligence Terminal) (SATCOM TACINTEL processing and dissemination).
7. 18TH BATTALION. Other key mission areas of concern include the loss of interrogation capability with the consolidation of the 18th BN to the Defense HUMINT Service later in the year. With the stand-up of DHS, all interrogation units would transition to the new agency leaving the Echelon Above Corps MI structure without an organic translation capability. The 18th BN is due to transfer to the DHS within the year. Other the four companies which comprise the battalion, two will be transferred in toto, and the CI company will be reduced by about one-third. The diversity of the echelon-above-corps brigade mission showed the difficulty in applying strict programmatic rules. The 18th BN contains personnel who speak 19 separate languages, including some priceless civilians who speak as many as eight. The 18th also serves as the Defense Investigative Service for security investigations in Europe and conducts all polygraph operations, functions which clearly have national-level associations. Both Colonels argued that JWICS video connectivity for the UCIRF was required.
8. USAFE/IN. Air Force was represented by Col. Joan Bullock. Her presentation sparked an animated discussion of the USAFE intelligence mission. Her VUGRAPHS depicted a precipitous decline in resources- on the order of 78%- but it appeared that this decline was a result of functional transfers to other commands and organizations which left “about a thousand” other Air Force personnel in Theater. It was unclear to whom these personnel were subordinated; likely, many were CCP/TCP resources. Col Bullock stated that with the organization now an organic component of the Air Operations Group (AOG) there was no requirement to support the JAC. There could be, she agreed, the possibility that USAFE IN personnel could augment a JTF Staff. More likely, she reasoned, is the contingency that the USAFE AOG would simply become the Joint Force Air Component Commander and hence the de facto JTF commander. Another recurring theme was funding Special Security Officer (SSO) billets. The USAFE share is reportedly 16 SSO billets and 53 DSNET-3 billets. In regard to the Vincenza-based DENY FLIGHT HQ operation, Mr. Dorn was critical of the appellation of the U.S-only intelligence organization as the “National Intelligence Center” (NIC). His concept was that this implied a funding source from the GDIP for what was clearly a tactical organization. There was a long discussion of the use of the term “National” in the NATO context of meaning it is restricted to the unit’s own nationality for security purposes. Mr. Dorn believes this to be needlessly confusing. Colonel Bullock indicated that she very strongly wanted JWICS video buy-up funded. Mr. Dorn was again very concerned in regard to funding sources in JWICS, saying that there has been a lack of a coherent plan in the distribution of T1 Line connectivity to the commands, and to the priority of the commands receiving it.
9. CINCUSNAVEUR. The Naval Component Commander was represented by CAPT Steve Monson, USN. The number one issue for NAVEUR is the resolution of the Fleet ocean Surveillance Information Facility (FOSIF) issue at Rota, Spain. CAPT Monson’s candid opinion was that “the FOSIF should be transitioned to Major Force Program (MFP) 2 and leave it intact, essentially as is.” He believes that the JAC is not sufficiently focused to support the direct Fleet support mission and that it was unlikely to do so in the future. When challenged by the idea that Navy would not protect the FOSIF in MFP 2, CAPT Monson said he recognized the potential for trouble but thought that it was preferable to a complete loss of capability. The potential for risk, however, was why they were willing to consider moving part of the FOSIF to the JAC. Mr. Dorn raised a variety of other topics, including the collection shortfall in imagery. CAPT Monson identified weaknesses in system migration and intelligence training. At the conclusion of the session, Mr. Dorn asked the CAPT how he felt about CLUSTER YEOMAN. The CAPT was nonplussed, and acknowledged that he knew nothing about it. Mr. Dorn was very assertive in demonstrating at all levels that the Department needed to do a better job of marketing collection capabilities to its intelligence professionals. REEF POINT was another program in point, although since this is an established program-of-rcord , the sensitivity to its worth is very high. There was also the unconfirmed rumor that a REEF POINT platform had been recently lost, but this was subsequently demonstrated to be untrue. Still, the possibility that this had occurred without the Theater being aware (or seeming to confirm the rumor) was disquieting.
10. DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE BELGRADE – COL ROBERT KERSHAW, USAF. The travails of the DATT in Belgrade were most illuminating, highlighting the difficulties military overt collection faces when the civilian policy makers reduce the number of DAO personnel and restrict the travel of the sole military attaché. Despite the restrictions, Col Kershaw conveyed some valuable lessons-learned on the HUMINT front. The 6’6″-inch tall officer is an imposing and impressive representative of the worldwide Defense Attaché system. His motorcycle was a trademark of his aggressive collection philosophy, which brought frustration as the DAO was reduced to a single officer and his movements and access to Serbian military personnel was drastically curtailed by the State Department. He stated that he was actively lobbying the DAO system to assign additional officers; however, the sense of the STAFFDEL was that this was unlikely to achieve success absent high-level pressure on State, and that the issue was lack of support in Washington via the DHS headquarters. In terms of his connectivity, however, he lauded the Defense Attaché Worldwide Network (DAWN) as a support mechanism to keep him in touch with his desk officer and the resources of the entire Intelligence Community. DAWN in fact was his only lifeline to the larger world, since State had denied permission for a JDISS terminal to be installed at the Embassy.
11. MARFOREUR was represented by MSGT Gary Reynolds, who gave perhaps the most poignant appeal of the morning. He had been largely silent during the CINCUSNAVEUR discussion and appealed for a few minutes to explain some issues regarding the Marine Corps posture in Theater. It was with disbelief that the delegation was apprised that the G2 staff of the Marine Component was comprised of two people, a USMC Lt Col and himself. Mr. Dorn raised what would become a continuing theme, that everyone seemed to accept without question the notion that the Corps was so deficient in resources that it was simply not possible to flesh out the necessary billet structure. Mr. Dorn observed that there were thousands of personnel available within the Corps intelligence TOE, and that it appeared to be a willful act to allow a Component Commander to have so few resources.
12. DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPRESENTITIVE TO THE SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED FORCES EUROPE (SHAPE). DIA’s representative to SHAPE is Mr. Steve Covington, who discussed the role and mission of the Survey Section at Mons. His opinion that the presence of a high-ranking SES civilian and himself conveyed the importance of the Alliance to other NATO countries and prompted them to contribute additional resources to the intelligence effort. This participation ensures that a unified intelligence architecture and interoperable ADP systems made sharing intel of the battlefield a reality.
13. JOINT ANALYSIS CENTER (JAC). Molesworth sent CDR Rick Morgan USN. Mr. Dorn raised the issue of UCIRF production of the Ground Order of Battle as a central issue of the JAC’s mission. He pressed the illogic of the Component providing the national database, when it logically should be resources and produced at the Theater level at the JAC. There was general agreement that the current arrangement reflected the past more than it did the objective model for the future. There was no question that the JAC was responsible for Theater OOB production; it was likewise clear that it was inadequately resourced to accomplish this task, particularly in light of the current crisis mission. In fact, the JIC/JAC Study of 1992 recommending the incorporation of the Army’s Joint Military Intelligence Support Element (JMISE) into the JAC resources had not envisioned the Yugoslav catastrophe. The JAC needs to be examined with an eye to rightsizing the command to deal with the mission at hand. Of interest, CDR Morgan was en route the UNPROFOR task force forward in ZAGREB to serve a rotational tour as the Deputy J2. The provision of personnel augmentees to the JTF’s and the UN Forces was a topic that Mr. Dorn had pressed earlier with Brig General Hayden; it was with the understanding that the resources that deployed were only a dozen or so at any given time that the issue appeared to be proportional and appropriate. With the completion of the development of the JAC in the 1997 timeframe, it will be much better prepared to accomplish baseline missions. None-the-less, the end-strength is probably not sufficient to deal with ongoing situations like the collapse of Yugoslavia. Despite this longer view, Mr. Dorn is concerned that the community managers are not stepping up to the shortfall in personnel in the near term.
14. SOCEUR. Special Operations in Europe was represented by a delegation of three, headed by Navy CAPT Shimella. The description of the command mission was punctuated by questions from the delegation on the use of the Special Operations Command Remote Analysis Terminal and Evaluation System (SOCRATES). This system had been held up as typical of the stove-pipe systems which hamper force integration. CAPT Shimella could not document a unique requirement for SOCRATES, with his civilian staff indicating that they only used it for accessing a CINCSOC database. The CAPT went on to indicate that SOC forces in Theater primarily relied on JDISS-E, which enables them to be interoperable throughout the EUCOM AOR. In terms of issues, the special operations manning at the JAC was of concern, mirroring concerns raised by USAREUR. Of seven billets at the JAC to support Special Operations, only two were filled. SOCEUR was very pleased, however, by the JAC’s ability to provide the macro Theater picture.
15. CIA. The Agency Representative to the CINC discussed Agency support to the Command. The local agent, working in a non-disclosed status, performed a core dissemination function, delivering special category material to concerned J-codes on the Staff. In fact, despite the high-level verbiage, the support function largely appeared to be delivery of finished products to the command. The method of distribution was in glaring contrast to the enhanced Theater military intelligence architecture and technology. The delegation was concerned that this dissemination issue was an issue and needed to be addressed. The old-fashioned method of distribution was counter-balanced by General Hayden, who described the difference between the Agency’s reporting on situations such as the FRY as being more “mature” than that provided by the JAC. The point was well taken by the delegation, as Mr. Dorn noted that the JAC was populated by analysts still on their second or third tours in the military, while the Agency DI analysts were able to take the longer view. CIA’s geopolitical analysis is the necessary adjunct to the OOB and military situation assessment done at the JAC. There was uniform consensus in the view that the analysis produced by the Investigations and Research (I&R) branch of the State Department was the least useful and most at variance with the reality as perceived in the Theater. Other issues: The Agency does not have (or have an interest in) systems like JDISS. The clandestine status of all Agency personnel in the Country- including those who only loaded pallets on aircraft- was a major concern. Mr. Dorn pointed out that the purported justification- that of terrorist threat- was at least as high for the active military force.
16. EUCOM ROUNDTABLE SUMMARY: During the outbrief with Gen Hayden (EUCOM J2), Mr. Dorn stated that he was very impressed by EUCOM and the emerging intelligence architecture. Clearly there had been tremendous strides in theater integration and support to joint operations. In regard to the functional transfer of component intelligence resources, the General indicated that he would be willing to accept the mission at the JAC if he was provided all of the resources to do so. The companion logic regarding some potential ground intelligence functional transfer was also discussed without a clear recommendation, although the FOSIF issue clearly indicates that a rigorous approach to “organic” Service resources in the Theater would be useful. Still, the free-fall in troops strength numbers made any planning problematic, and it served no useful purpose to break the system without some assurance that the function would indeed be reconstituted elsewhere in a more programmatically pure manner, Despite these issues, it was clear that there have been significant advances in Joint intelligence cooperation, intelligence support and JAC operations. Mr. Dorn acknowledged that although he often focused on 5% of the picture that needed fixing, there was 95% that was in good shape. Gen Hayden responded that he valued Mr. Dorn’s candor and obvious support for the theater as a whole. In bounding the problem posed by the Balkan crisis, it is useful to consider the vast scope of what it will require to terminate UN involvement. There are huge inventories of various countries’ equipment. On the basis of extricating necessary equipment, it would take two years to get all material out of the FRY.
17. ISSUES:
– European Troop Strength below 65,000. Intelligence must take “fair share” and hurt is disproportionate.
– JWICS funding is uncertain and not logical.
– Systems interoperability (LOCE, JDISS, JWICS, JDISS-E, SOCRATES) and funding are real concerns.
– Airborne Reconnaissance/UAV programs require additional resources and integration.
– HUMINT. Defense HUMINT Service (DHS) Stand-up, CIA operations and interoperability
– UN and JTF Intelligence support still require doctrinal consideration.
– Uneven and short-term TDY tours in support of the crisis lead to problems in institutional memory, leaving the commands with a sort of “institutional Alzheimer’s disease” in lack of a short term memory.
18. MUNICH HUMINT OPERATIONS. After a very full morning, STAFFDEL Dorn departed Patch Barracks under partly cloudy skies en route the Stuttgart train station. The delegation boarded the Inter-City Express (ICE) Train, the high-speed rail connector to Munich, after a productive afternoon session on the train in which numerous topics raised in the morning roundtables were fully discussed. Upon arrival in Munich, the delegation was met by CAPT Brent Canaday, the current Commanding Officer of CTF-168.4, the Navy overt HUMINT office. CAPT Canaday is also the prospective Base Commander of the DHS Operating Base in Stuttgart. First off on the visit was an orientation and windshield tour of the city en route a meeting with the CIA Chief of Station (COS), who had journeyed down from Bonn at the Delegation’s request. The COS was accompanied by key staff members from the country team at the former Voice of America house downtown. A cordial session was conducted as the Station Chief outlined his views of the mission in Germany, the relation with the Host Nationals, who he indicated were feeling a new sense of nationhood and sovereignty. The Chief pointedly wore his jump-wing tie clip to demonstrate his commitment to military support. He went on to stress his total commitment to an aggressive program of support to the Services. He indicated that the relationship between DoD HUMINT and the Agency was vastly improved, with a single DHS point of contact for all DoD HUMINT activities. He pointed out that he had an initiative to establish a DHS billet on his staff, and that initiative would benefit both the Station and the military. He indicated that an Agency billet on the DHS staff would likewise be a further step in integration. There were questions about a classified DHS program that the Station Chief indicated was working very well. An interesting topic at the meeting was the Chief’s view on the question of whether he actually knew about all overt and clandestine HUMINT intelligence activities being conducted in the country. He indicated that he was “just getting a handle on it.”
19. After departing the VOA facility, the delegation proceeded to the historic Navy House for a private discussion with CAPT Canaday. The historic home has just completed an extensive refurbishment and is in its best condition since the end of the WW2, when it passed from the hands of the Nazi SS and into the custody of the United States Army. Originally constructed by a wealthy returnee from the United States, the dark wood paneling gleams and the white plaster is freshly painted. Mr. Dorn and Mr. Reese were able to get a fresh perspective on the local view of how HUMINT was functioning. CAPT Canaday’s view was that relations with the Agency were improving. While they were not always responsive to military requirements, they were at least making an effort. This was in contrast to his relations with the new administration of the DHS. While he was convinced that the functional integration of the service HUMINT resources was the right thing to do, the initial crawling-before-walking was producing the usual glitches. Thus far, the DHS management had not been responsive, and in act had not answered his last six messages. Further, the issue appeared to be an inside-the-Beltway decision-making loop. CAPT Canaday expressed his exasperation, citing the example of a GS-14 billet on his Stuttgart JMP which was taken away without consultation immediately before the hiring board for DHS positions was convened. After concluding the visit, the delegation traveled by van to the Munich airport, where they boarded a Lufthansa flight to Leonardo da Vinci airport at Rome.
20. 10-13 APR 95. ROME, NAPLES, GAETA AND VINCENZA, ITALY. Upon arrival at Rome International, the delegation was met by Lt Col Bill Hines, A/ARMA of the Defense Attaché Office. Bill additionally serves in a classified program of interest to the Committee and is an outstanding representative of the DAO. An Army Foreign Area Officer, he brings necessary knowledge of an important area to the country team. His billet is being filled on a one-time basis by Army, and will return to a Navy relief upon his departure. On the drive into Rome, Colonel Hines conducted an area familiarization tour of some of the Fascist-era architecture still utilized as headquarters for the Italian government. The new city area retains the sense of the Mussolini area. It remains remarkably “modernistic” in style and is readily identifiable to residents of Washington as representing a particularly rigid line of the early 1930’s severe neo-classiest architectural style.
21. ROME. The delegation arrived at the Hotel Grand Flora on the Via Venetto at nearly 2300. The Hotel had served as the wartime headquarters of the German Geheime Staats Polezie (GESTAPO). The slightly frayed elegance of the structure added to the continental atmosphere; located three blocks from the embassy and adjacent to both the medieval City Wall and Harry’s American Bar, the Flora offers a superb free breakfast and a special rate for travelers on official business. The next day being Sunday, the delegation was confronted by the lack of opportunity of substantive briefings. With the day at their feet, the delegation arose early for a brisk jog in the Villa Borgese, conveniently located on the opposite side of the old City wall from the Hotel. After an equally brisk breakfast, the group began a forced march across the Eternal City that would occupy the rest of the day. First off was the Spanish Stair, located about a quarter mile form the hotel. The first Church of fifteen examined that Palm Sunday was at the head of the Stair; the delegation encountered a group of Gypsy women and children, who attempted a grab-and-run on the delegation’s personal belongings. The STAFFDEL retained their icy composure and faced them down. Upon reaching the bottom of the Stair, they made a course for the Trevi Fountain, which was just being basked by the light of the morning sun. The skies were cloudless and brilliant Mediterranean blue. The breathtaking effect would continue for the remainder of the day. Subsequent highlights of this magnificent day included views of the Pantheon, numerous plazas, the Castle San Angelo, a Palm Sunday blessing by the Pontiff at Saint Peter’s with the assembled masses, a brisk walk through a tangled web of cobblestone streets to a delightful sidewalk cafe. After Lunch, Mr. Dorn left to prepare the next day’s agenda, while the remainder of the party continued on a walking tour past the Tiber island, the Temple of the Vestels, the Circus Maximus, the Baths of Caracalla, the Coliseum and the Roman Forum, with a car fire thrown in for Roman flavor. Gathering that evening with CDR Dennis Priccolo, the EUCOM Intelligence Architecture Officer, the delegation began discussions on the next day’s activities, which featured detailed discussions with the JTF intelligence team at AFSOUTH and the COMSIXTHFLT staff at Gaeta. Dinner was splendid, in a high ceilinged but intimate establishment a few blocks west of the Flora. The Italians appeared disconcerted by the determination of the Delegation to have a nice, well-paced dinner and depart in an orderly manner. It was not the first such reaction to the STAFDEL.
23. NAPLES. Departing the hotel at 0600, the next morning, the delegation was delivered to the chaos outside the central train station Lt. Col. Hines for the trip to Naples. Passing the Campo Praetorio (a continuously occupied military garrison for nearly 2,000 years and once home to the elite Praetrorian Guards, who selected their own Caesars) the group made the train with minutes to spare and began an intensive discussion on the key issues involving the Joint Task Force. The primary issues appeared to be connectivity, resources and mission. It was clear that the funding sources for many of the organizations and systems did not make a logically consistent architecture. Mr. Dorn was determined to determine where those specific inconsistencies were located.
24. THE JTF PROVIDE PROMISE JIC. After changing trains from the express to the local metro, the delegation arrived at Bagnoli, the local stop closest to the NATO Armed Forces South (AFSOUTH) Headquarters. The AFSOUTH compound, once a German WWII facility, is well maintained and landscaped with the buildings transitioning to tunnels burrowed into a commanding hill. The delegation was met at the AIRSOUTH building near the central parade ground by Col. Paul Simms, USA, the JTF PROVIDE PROMISE JIC Commander.
25. BACKGROUND OF JTF PROVIDE PROMISE INTELLIGENCE. The JTF Provide Promise team is the command element of all U.S. forces in the former republic of Yugoslavia. The J2 has been established around the core of the Southern Region Joint Operational Intelligence Center, which has a permanent party manning of 13 personnel. CDR Bill Reiske is the JOIC Officer in Charge, and in the JTF structure reports to the TDY Colonel who serves Admiral Smith in the Admiral’s role as JTF Commander. The J2 force structure as augmented includes 42 additional personnel, for a total of 55 onboard. National support to the JTF is focused through the National Intelligence Support Team (NIST) the Joint Intelligence Liaison Element (JILE) Cryptologic Support Group[ (CSG) and the DIA Detachment. This civilian analyst, a DIA resource, was singled out as a unique a valuable asset by Col. Simms, due to her extensive regional expertise. Her contributions illustrated the migrational nature of the intelligence problem at the JTF. Early in the establishment of the organization, the requirement is for technical expertise for systems integration, connectivity and networking. Later, as the ADP support infrastructure becomes mature the requirement shifts from systems knowledge to analytic capability. Hence, the personnel mix needs to be dynamic and responsive to the Commander’s requirements. Likewise, there was a gradual shift in the center of gravity of the analytic capability. Early in the crisis, the national agencies normally will have the best estimative baseline. This will progressively shift forward through the Theater JIC, with those in closest proximity to the action eventually having the best appreciation for the subtlety of the situation.
26. CURRENT SITUATION AT THE JIC. After coffee was poured, the Colonel began an overview of the JIC’s roles and missions. The turnover in personnel is readily apparent; Colonel Simms is the third (or fourth!) commander of the unit since it’s establishment two years ago. While the Commander’s tour lengths are normally six months long, watch-standers are TDY for as litle as three months. Questions from the delegation revolved around manning and function of the JIC. Mr. Dorn asked if the number of personnel was sufficient to accomplish the mission. Col. Simms responded that he believed the level was sufficient, though due to the high turnover he had weaknesses in specific skills, notably in collection management.
27. COLLECTION MANAGEMENT. The requirement for crisis-specific collection management is of a high level of urgency and the expert personnel hard to come by. Training and expertise is a never-ending cycle, since the watch-floor is turning over literally every month or so. Other questions regarding tactical reconnaissance reflected the sense that the collections expertise was located elsewhere. Col. Simms indicated that all reconnaissance issues were by the DENY FLIGHT people at Vicencia. He further indicated that they were not always responsive to the JTF’s needs. It is interesting to note that the indication of problems in communication or responsiveness equate to the echelon of command where there are the fewest clear guidelines about funding sources. The JTF has a significant level of General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) funding to account for systems, personnel and connectivity. In terms of unique collection assets available ot the JTF, the issue of Unmanned Autonomous Vehicles (UAVs) was raised. The initial deployment of the LOFTY VIEW in June 1995 was described as a success within the ad hoc framework in which it was deployed. One characterization was “When it was up, it was good.” The natural rejoinder is that it had been up only a few times and was not up now.
28. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS ON THE PENNINSULA. The Vincenza command- termed the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) would (in a U.S. only context) be termed the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC). The funding source for this echelon of Command is a Service responsibility; accordingly, the collision of National, Service and NATO funding made the CAOC a difficult command to analyze for efficiency. In that context, the Close Air Support (CAS) and Air Presence missions were discussed from the perspective of the JTF command and control. The current operations posture involved NATO aircraft airborne over Sarajevo but no shooting. This was termed “Air Presence” without strike operations. The intent was to allow the adversaries to hear that there was iron in the air, available for the UN to respond. The roles and functions of the “Two Key” concept, under which someone from both the NATO and UN chain had to approve each step was described. The role and process involved in supporting UNPROFO was also described as a ad hoc function, under which informal contacts were utilized to provide necessary data from the JTF to the UN. The UN G2 has no ability to directly task the JTF J2, but the informal link was strong. The Deputy J2 was normally provided from the JTF or a European intelligence command. One of the roundtable participants from the JAC, CDR Morgan, was in fact en route to the UNPROFOR Headquarters forward to a TDY period. This non-linear arrangement was described at some length, particularly in light of Mr. Dorn’s concern about that the high number of Liaison Officers at all the commands visited. It began to appear that the only way to effectively do business under the fragmented command structure was to embed officers from the parent commands within the UN and NATO structures so they could in fact task the parents for support and information outside the existing official chains of command. For example, Colonel Simms noted that the mechanism to provide intelligence support to NATO was through the USAFE liaison officers forward in Sarajevo, who in turn could in turn provide appropriately sanitized information to those who required it…..and who could reach back into the US Commands to get it.
29. WORK-AROUNDS. This network of work-arounds appeared to be acceptable to the participants as the cost of doing business in four separate and highly distinct cultures: US-Component, US Joint Service, NATO and the UN. The fact that it functions at all, in light of the constant personnel turn-over was indeed a tribute to the professionalism and commitment of all the players. The contrast between the EUCOM organization and NATO and the UN was stark. Where once the Components had operated in fiercely independent modes, competing in not only warfare areas but within intelligence collection and dissemination activities. Now, the draw-down and consolidation had forced a level of coherence and cooperation that was quite startling compared to the days before the fall of the war. In contrast, the NATO system demonstrated quite astonishing duplication in national effort, forced by the inability to fully share intelligence based on each nation’s unique sources-and-methods. The UN, often working under strict rules not to collect classified information, mandated yet another layer. An ongoing theme in depicting the difficulty of dealing with the situation on the ground was the fact that the UN forces operated under the Charter provisions which precluded tactical collection in the area of their forces. Further discussion of this issue must be made at the classified level.
30. TIME TO RECONGIZE CRISIS NEEDS. Mr. Dorn viewed the personnel system of augmentees with concern, since every command appeared to be manned with a hodge-podge of TDY personnel from Reserve Units, Theater Commands and Combat Support Agencies. The number of augmentees prompted the question of why the JTF was so inadequately manned. After all, with the crisis going on two years of age, it must be nearing the time when the response had to be codified and personnel ordered in on a semi-permanent basis. With so many people temporally assigned from other Commands, who was doing the work back home? No one could provide exact numbers of liaison personnel in the EUCOM theatre. In particular, Mr. Dorn viewed the JAC as serving in the “force provider” role vice the Components. In point of fact, the JTF in Naples had only one JAC person, with most of our personnel come from SRJOIC or the Components. One area in which there was a clear disparity of resources was in the number of Marines assigned. There seemed to be the widespread perception throughout all the commands the delegation visited that there simply not enough Corps intelligence personnel in the larger force, and accordingly, there was no point in asking for them. The JTF leadership responded somewhat defensively that there was no requirement at this time for additional amphibious expertise, and that should there be an emerging expeditionary warfare requirement, they would request it.
31. SYSTEMS/ADP ISSUES. Systems consolidation and interoperability provided the framework on which all the intelligence dissemination was hung. EUCOM is still saddled with a variety of intelligence operating systems, some U.S.-funded (and some by the Services) and some funded through NATO, which accounts for the large number. Still huge strides have been made in coming to common software and applications. The number of discrete systems in Theater is dropping steadily as the functional managers force the Services into migration systems. The role of the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) in this regard cannot be understated: the concept of common interoperable software with agreed protocols and applications was responsible for the single greatest leap forward. When coupled with the data stream provided by the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications Systems (JWICS), this brought forward the possibility of seamless national-to-tactical level intelligence support through video, bulk data transfer and file search in a “pull” architecture which did not overwhelm the operational end of the system. This does not mean that the Theater is without commonality problems. The JTF does not have Socrates and ISAS, though the command believes it will be suitably augmented should the requirement arise, since with initiation of special or expeditionary operations, Special Forces/Marines will/should bring that capability with them. Additional issues confront the JTF in addressing multi-level classification issues on a single host system like the NATO Linked Operations Centers- Europe (LOCE). There is no such capability at this time, so the answer has been to operate redundant and separate networks in addition to LOCE. CDR Pricollo, the EUCOM Intelligence Architecture Officer commented that on a test case basis, ROTA had just recently married OBU and JDISS on one multi-level system, JAC-3, allowing different levels of access to different users.
32. SOUTHERN REGION JOINT OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER (SRJOIC). The actual core of the JTF intelligence effort is the NATO southern region intelligence center- the SRJOIC. As the actual permanent-party NATO component commander, CDR Bill Reiske commented that since his people we there for the long haul- not TDY- it was incumbent on them to ensure that they did not burnout through constant work and crisis response. The SRJOIC has obviously had to change the way they do business since the JTF Provide Promise was camped in it’s spaces. Mr. Dorn observed that since the JTF had been around longer than the entire Persian Gulf War, it was probably time to do something more than send in augmentees. CDR Reiske also commented that potential augmentation from FOSIF Rota billets, should the command be moved, might be useful. He did not envision absorbing a large number of permanent party personnel.
33. CDR Olsen from J3 Provide Promise appeared and immediately went into a confrontational posture with the delegation over the accessibility of Sarajevo. After telling the delegation that he had “personally” turned the STAFDEL down for further travel forward into Sarajevo. He backed down quickly when Mr. Dorn began to inquire into the real decision-making process, which was made at a considerably higher level. CDR Olsen did provide a useful summary of the latest name change for the UN operations and numbers of U.S. personnel assigned:
– UNCRO = UN Confidence Restoration Operations in Croatia 302
Personnel, JTF Forward, US Hospital and Augmentees to UNHCR
– UNPROFOR = UN Protection Forces (now exclusively to refer to Bosnia/Herzegovina (BH) 17 Personnel. Augmentees and Liaison Officers to UNPROFOR/UNHCR
– UNPREDEP = UN preventive deployment (provide deterrence to further southward spread of the conflict) 541 Personnel; TASK FORCE
– ABLE SENTRY, Staff augmentees to UNPREDEP HQ
34. EW FROM THE SHED. Discussions with Col. Annas, USAF, NATO Deputy J2, lead to the conclusion that the national representatives who serve in the Secure Handling and Evaluation Detachment (SHED) were doing a fine job, given that the realities of the NATO environment made their analysis and assessments far too time late to serve as the basis for military action. The national cryptologic agencies from the NATO have their presence in the tunnels, physically separate from the JTF, made them seem less than relevant, it was largely because the operational impact of their presence was symbolic. The SHED product line, though time-late, had the advantage of being fully releasable to NATO partners.
35. TF INTELLIGENCE WRAP-UP. In summing up the issues, COL Simms, JTF-Provide Promise J2, first emphasized that his people were working hard and turning out a quality product. He felt that his support from the national agencies was generally adequate and resources were provided according to his requirements. In terms of problem areas, he emphasized the inadequacy of his collection capability, which he bluntly characterized as “UNSAT”. The reasons were largely due to the use of UN restrictions and the fact that TDY personnel ordered in to fulfill the collection management slots were normally not skilled in the demanding disciplines required by the FRY crisis. He additionally felt that there was a deficiency in HUMINT overall requirements, which were not being met due to the fact that he lacked the ability to task HUMINT resources DHS. He felt strongly that while the imagery-heavy collection systems were doing a reasonable job, the essential elements of information in HUMINT were not being met in BH. He also voiced the opinion that TACRECCE is was not forthcoming in a timely manner, and that accordingly, DENY FLIGHT did not support the JTF fully.
36. OUTCALL FROM THE JTF. Preparing to depart the compound, the delegation made an out-call on the Provide Promise JTF Chief of Staff, RADM Cole. In response to Mr. Dorn’s question regarding the adequacy of intelligence support, he responded ” It is as good as I have ever seen it.” Since he was formerly Chief of Staff at COMSECONDFLEET, the test-bed command for C3I systems, this was high tribute. He went on to explain that he felt there were geographic-specific requiring good maps for the foot soldier. He echoed General Hayden’s comments that ” No one here has white hats, everyone lies, no one keeps their word, so it is very difficult to operate with any certainty. The NIST support teams are great. The UAV deployment of LOFTY VIEW also is a wonderful development, but it was a poor choice of timing for the deployment.” He explained that requirements of the JTF were for something more on the line of Predator: long dwell, long range, multi-discipline collectors. Problem areas included the lack of emphasis the UN has on force protection and the lack of organic SIGINT collection resources on the ground in the FRY. He believes that the JAC is great on theatre level support and national collection such as overhead systems. They are not sufficiently mature to provide the granularity of analysis to provide direct unit support. The JTF relations with the Theater were very good; the Admiral indicated that he spoke nearly every day with the J2 in Stuttgart, terming his relationship with General Hayden like “blood brothers.” He also felt that there were some unsung heroes are the Balkan Task Force at CIA, providing great and timely support. He felt that personnel from NSA and DIA were top-notch, the national level has definitely been moving forward.
37. HELO RIDE TO GAETA. The delegation proceeded to the top of the Hill above the tunnel complex at AFSOUTH where there was a spectacular view of the Neapolitan countryside and the isle of Capri, home of the vacation villas of the Roman Emperors. The group met VADM Joe Prueher, COMSIXTH FLEET/STRIKING FORCES SOUTH at the pad for the thirty-five minute SH-3 flight up the coast to the Flagship, the USS LASALLE. The ship was moored outboard of an Fast Supply Ship (AFS) in the lovely bay where the picturesque resort village straggles up a steep hill from the ruins of an Empress’s palace on the shore. Upon debarking on the helo flight deck, the delegation trooped forward to the Admiral’s in-port cabin for an initial round of discussions. The Admiral opened immediately with the issue that apparently concerns him the most, the future of the GDIP-funded Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Facility (FOSIF) at Rota, Spain. It was clear that he does not want to lose the Rota capability; he termed it his “surge suppressor” to ensure the Fleet was not caught by surprise. The Admiral recognizes that the funding profile of the FOSIF does not match that of the other Service Components in the Theater (Both the USAFE/IN and the USCIRF are in MFP-2). Further, in the USCINCPAC Area of Responsibility (AOR) the analogous FOSIF was incorporated into the Theater JIC- JICPAC. Recognizing that change has to be made, .the issue how to do it successfully? The Admiral pointed out that moving the Command was bound to incur MILCON expenditures, possibly to satisfy a programmatic, vice operational, imperative. Still, the issue came to the Sixth Fleet in a visceral manner. This was their Service intelligence capability, and it clearly was going to change, for good or for ill. The Admiral noted that “…our balance of joint and service representation this theater is about right.” It appears clear that both the Navy component and the Theater J2 prefer the current arrangement, absent some compelling argument to the contrary. In discussions with J2 personnel the compelling logic that the EUCOM intelligence architecture was out of sync with the other Theaters appeared to be of marginal interest. Only when confronted by the contention that this programmatic anomaly was at some point liable to attract unfavorable Committee attention at some future date did the logic of the FOSIF transfer to England begin to make sense. All concerned appear anxious to make the theater architecture reflect a unity of programmatic function. After nearly an hour of discussion, the Admiral turned the delegation over to CDR Darryl Fengya, pleading an appointment in Naples.
38. TOUR AND CONNECTIVITY OF THE USS LASALLE. In the N2 spaces, the intelligence personnel of the command where brought together to discuss the requirements of the Fleet and concerns. The first issue to deal with is one of perspective. The Fleet staff is now embarked on the LaSalle, formerly the flagship of the Persian Gulf Squadron. As a Command Ship, LaSalle is markedly smaller than the flagships of the other Numbered Fleets. It is less capable in terms of connectivity, although there are several initiatives to ensure that the Fleet Commander is fully interoperable with the CINC and the other Components. The staff was formerly embarked on the USS Belknap, a cruiser, and to move aboard that ship, overall staff manning was slashed to accommodate the reduced spaces. The Marine billets on the staff were eliminated in the early 1980’s, part as a consequence of the reduction in the staff, and partly (as Mr. Dorn observed) because the mission area was disrespected. All expeditionary warfare support was provided from Rota; of interest, Rota was once resourced with Marine intelligence personnel to accomplish this mission. The personnel involved were gradually being transferred to the JAC at Molesworth. The central issue to the intelligence personnel was that they were smaller and thus required more off-board support from Rota. Rota is considered critical for Fleet Support because “it is directly responsive to us and our operations and its proximity to us is of great value.” There followed briefings, discussions and tour (of newly renovated intelligence spaces) with N2 staff, to include CDR Fengya and CDR Kurdys, the Fleet Cryptologist. The feeling from the deck-plates was what might be expected from an operating unit: they were pleased with their current structure and apprehensive about changes to it. In response to questions about connectivity, the staff codes were pleased with current architecture. JDISS-E was up and running. they had access to ISAS when they needed it. The delegation voiced concerns in regard to a perceived Rota mission creep, and that it had functions that were duplicative in view of the expanding JAC capability. They are of “uniqueness” was explored, particularly in the area of Merchant shipping analysis. To a limited degree Rota was in fact repackaging some merchant-related information, but that function was largely a cut-and-tailor of that which was done at Suitland by the national ONI capability. Mr. Dorn asked if the command was aware of the CLUSTER YEOMAN program, and there was the general sense that some emerging collection systems did not have advance publicity from the national level. This responsibility for advance work was taken aboard by the delegation as an issue to be raised with ONI. The staff noted that they had many systems and a rationale for each. Resident on the Flagship was a GENSER and SI JDISS. LOC-E was maintained for the NATO effort. The new Navy GCCS imagery sub-system NIEWS (GENSER) had been provided for imagery connectivity of systems such as the Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance Pods System (TARPS). All was noted as being legacy systems that would migrate to a single system. The culmination of the tour was the walk-through of a barge which had been floated into the well-deck and which provided staterooms, working spaces and habitation for any contingency JTF staff augmentation. The barge occupied the former well-deck spaces of the amphibious ship. The delegation remained on the ship until nearly 2000. After debarking the flagship, the delegation took a late dinner on the waterfront before embarking the bus for the long ride back to the Autostrada and Rome, arriving at midnight.
39. AMERICAN EMBASSY ROME AND CHIEF OF STATION. After a short night’s sleep and a brisk jog in the Villa Borgheze, the formal morning activities were conducted at the Embassy, arguably the most beautiful complex in the State Department inventory. The Defense Attache, CAPT Philip Bozelli and the USAREUR Representative, Col Andres A. Arzanini were joined by Lt. Col. Neal for a roundtable discussion. CAPT Bozzelli was most informative on the special relation we enjoy with the Italians. He said that the Italians got along very well without an executive branch because the bureaucracy never changed. He stressed that “Italy was very much ours to lose” and pointed out that the ALUSNA had been on station in Rome since the 1880s. “This is the most cooperative area in the world” said the Captain. “They view us as the guarantors of their safety. And what you can’t forget is that they are the most competent military in the Med. We need to remind ourselves to send flowers once in a while and not take them for granted.” Because of self-imposed State Department restrictions, The DATT explained that the DAO team couldn’t collect directly against the Yugoslavs or the Balkans and we are not allowed to take advantage of the Italian collection capabilities in this area. The Italians are a great source of information on many countries here and in the Middle East that they have had long-term relationships with – it is a waste not to take full advantage of this on the military side. He went on to say that the State Department does not have the same close rapport and working relationship with their Italian counterparts, as does the U.S. military side. Instead they are alienating the Italian government – which is allowing their country to be used as the primary base for NATO, US and UN Balkans related operations. He indicated that there was the Italian perception that State Department held them in low esteem and that the Italians are growing tired of being viewed in this manner. He emphasized that the military side of the Embassy- the DAO- focused continually on improving the relationship with Italian counterparts and fostering our intelligence exchanges – from which the U.S. can benefit greatly. The DATT was very concerned about the future/long-term relationship between the US and Italy – believing it is in grave danger. Italy may not be there for the US in the future. A further concern was noted in that there was no direct link to the CINC and CINC requirements. Since everything the DAO releases is thru the State Department, some items of CINC interest are not released or don’t get to him. CAPT Bozelli noted that the intelligence relationships and chains of command in theatre (especially on the HUMINT side) need to be reexamined by DIA. He saw that there was a great deal of redundancy of taskings relating to the Balkans. In terms of resources, the DATT indicated that DIA supported them well in this area. The synergistic relations with the Italian Services paid major dividends in such areas as Middle East fundamentalism. The Italians are very concerned and are interested in working together on it. That was an area where the Italians were very good. On the other hand, they could not afford a great deal of U.S. equipment and much US military hardware. was beyond their means. Still, they have a great Navy and Air Force. The Army is in a state of transition. Still based on a conscripted model, there was high turnover and a huge investment in obsolete infrastructure. The Army is in crisis.
40. ROME STATION CHIEF AND NSA REPS: a fascinating and productive discussion was held in the secure Bubble regarding the specific classified missions of the CIA and NSA. While the details must remain covered in a classified annex, the wide-ranging discussion was extremely valuable in terms of gauging the field reaction to the Ames Affair, the role of the station in the new world order and thoughts on the direction of clandestine intelligence collection in hard target communities and areas. In his opening remarks, he said that “… I would like to talk about my young case officers. Because of all that has been happening publicly with the Agency, some of our young case officers are in crisis and we as an Agency have to address this.” The overall response to global terrorism had increased security to the extent that the “drop-in” traffic that had provided valuable intelligence in the past had virtually gone away. Relationships with the military were also discussed, particularly in the context of previous discussions with Chief’s of Station in other countries. An issue appeared to be in a breakdown with the Department of State here, which had commenced a policy of dramatically cutting our critical operations against the Yugoslav target and others, which was reminiscent of remarks from the DAO in Belgrade. This meeting was the most valuable of all the encounters with the Agency in Europe.
41. TRAVEL TO VINCENZA AND JTF DENY FLIGHT/5TH ATAF. Upon examination of the airline schedule, it was determined that travel by train would afford relief to the JTF (who would not have to drive both ways to Milan) and a chance for the delegation to meet and discuss the issues raised on the trip thus far. Accordingly, the delegation embarked an inter-city train for the trip from Rome to Vincenza. The four hours were very valuable and the countryside rolled in a gradual change from the lush green of Rome through the hills to the plains around Vincenza. Arriving in the late afternoon sunshine, the city center bustled with Northern Italians finished with work and thronging the central park, where children played and the carousel turned. The delegation was met by DENY FLIGHT J2/CAOC Col Elliott, USAF and USNIC Chief, Maj. Abraham at the train station. The delegation proceeded to the 5th ATAF headquarters, home of the JTF and which is celebrating the second anniversary of the establishment of the force. Col. Elliot directed the group to the Five Star Conference Room and began a general orientation of the command. She outlined the three-fold mission of DENY FLIGHT. The mission is to conduct aerial monitoring, and to enforce the no-fly zone (UNSCR 816; Provide protective air cover at the request of UNPROFOR (UNSCR 836 and 958); and to conduct approved air strikes on order from and in coordination with the UN in the Safe Areas around:
Bihac, Gorazde, Sarajevo, Tuzla and Zepa.
Mr. Dorn indicated that he preferred to cut to the issues, rather than belabor the standard command presentation. Col. Elliot responded with now-familiar litany, although the problems seemed more critical here. She said that her personnel turnover was 1/3 every 30 days. Of the 57 billets present, only 7 are permanent party assigned to the 5th ATAF; this reduced corporate memory and accelerated burnout of those permanently assigned. (There was a sardonic reference to the fact that the families called the JTF “Operation DENY WIFE” because the active duty members were at the base so often.. Another piece of humor came from a Navy officer who noted that the Carrier in the Adriatic often had more on-station time that the watch-standers at Vincenza, and sometimes told them how to get the information they needed by giving them directions within the 5th ATAF HQ building. “Just go up the stairs to the cappuccino machine” the Carrier intel officers would tap into their JDISS in chatter mode “and turn right down the hall to get to the current intelligence shop.”) She noted that there is a SHED detachment at the base, which is useful for the dissemination of multi-national SIGINT. The LOCE system links the NATO players into the process. In fact, the Colonel went on to say that “If it wasn’t for LOCE we would be DIW (dead in the water). It is the only way to communicate with and push intelligence to the Allies.” Since there are tactical aircraft from six NATO allies and the NATO AWACS involved, this is critical connectivity. Also, since the US is basically out of the TAC RECCE business, all the reconnaissance flights here are flown by NATO nations. No US aircraft are here operating until the Carrier returns. Problems include the quality of the U2 imagery that is forwarded from the UK. The image quality off the JDISS was totally unacceptable due to an unidentified system glitch. In terms of the reliability of UN reporting, CDR Nancy Clark, the Current Intelligence officer, responded that “the essence of a report is reliable – but that the details get lost or confused in the multiple English-as-a-second-language translations.” Her staff was responsible to always run the info down as close to the source as possible.
42. TOUR OF THE US NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER (USNIC):
After touring the 5th ATAF building and the combined intelligence and operations centers, the delegation departed the well-appointed facility for the walk to the tent SCIF where the U.S.-only National Intelligence Center is located. On the walk the Colonel noted that the JTF would soon be moving out of the building and into similar tents- so that the 5th ATAF Staff could move back into their old offices. It was unclear exactly what mission the NATO Command was doing which was that of the JTF, which had just completing 80,000 air sorties in support of the UN. At the NIC, a Naval intelligence reserve watch officer launched a fierce personal assessment of systems and connectivity in support of the JTF. She told the delegation that the roll-away JWICS terminal in the next room had been installed in December 1994 and had only been used a couple of times since then. In addition, no one at the NIC or J2 was properly trained to operate the JWICS and they were not quite sure why they had it. This was an accurate description from the Watch perspective- since the system had been installed as a result of a Gen. Ryan, Gen. Chambers and Gen. Hayden decision to support the UAV operations and provide a dissemination vehicle for the UAV imagery. The personnel who set up the system had departed the Theater upon completion of those operations (scheduled to resume in 1995.) There were also tangled funding issues- this particular JDISS terminal had been intended for USAFE, and was diverted within Theater resources- was in fact not well supported because it was not funded by the National level. The real issue appears to be the rapid turn-over of personnel and lack of continuity in maintenance personnel. Also, as the watch pointed out “Electrons don’t work properly south of the Alps.” This remark referred to troublesome infrastructure issues in attempting to support enciphered communications over sometimes unreliable lines. The Watch also felt that the DIA JDISS operator was underemployed. As other personnel became familiar and proficient with the system, the DIA augmentee became a redundant capability. The DIA billet could accordingly be replaced by an analyst or subject matter expert (SME). The fact that the apparent JWICS problems were not relayed via JDISS back to DIA was also mentioned as an oddity. The Watch officer also complained that DIA was not being responsive, but upon examination, it appeared that the issue was in the inability of the JTF to formulate the question.
43. PROBLEMS AT THE JTF. The litany of problems that emerged from this evening session indicates that this echelon of command has significant problems. The first and most prominent is the lack of continuity of personnel. Watch-standers and permanent party people appear frustrated with the lack of training and the lack of information about how things work. Layering the tangled NATO and UN decision-making process atop this lack of institutional memory, local Base politics, and intense operating tempo and the result is a continuing crisis in intelligence support where RFIs are not answered (because the force does not know who or how to ask them) and ADP support does not work. For example, no one at the NIC or the CAOC knew RFI procedures. The NIC Chief didn’t realize there was a Balkan Task Force at the NMJIC or one at CIA that could support whatever RFI’s the JAC could not handle– and he had a JWICS system in the tent that could have them on-line in person. This appears to be a training deficiency that will have to be worked continually in light of the high personnel turnover.
44. Conversations over dinner with Colonel Elliott and CDR Clark reinforced the notion that the Command was staffed by dedicated professionals who were coping well under difficult circumstances. The success or failure of international pollicies were clearly beyond the scope of the JTF (i.e, rules of engagement and non-traditional military operations) as was solving intricately crafted command relationships which have grown over a half century (national information sharing policies which force redundancy). The areas where improvement can be made on the JTF/NATO/UN intelligence support issue is making a strong commitment to the continuity of long term manning, knowledgeable collection managers, and dedication to ensure that connectivity was maintained through programmatic juncture between nationally-funded and theater/Service funded systems. It may be that the greatest contribution that can be made to the existing system is to encourage a unified funding system which will ensure that discontinuities such as the useless roll-away JWICS do not occur.
45. After remaining overnight at the Hotel Jolly Europa, the delegation departed Vincenza via van with Major Abraham en route Milan Linate Airport. At that point Mr. Winchester and CDR Roberts detached the group for further transport to Malpensa airfield and connections to Washington, DC. Mr. Dorn, Mr. Reese, CDR Socotra and CDR Pricollo flew on to Zagreb, Croatia via Swissair connection in Zurich. The flight to Croatia was uneventful under partly cloudy skies. Upon recovering at Zagreb International, the taxi to the terminal revealed a significant portion of the Croatian air order of battle. Six MI-25 HIND helicopter gunships were observed on individual hardstands adjacent to the taxiway and at least two MIG-21’s were clearly visible near their bunkered hangarettes.
46. ZAGREB AND THE JTF FORWARD. After deplaning, the delegation was met by CWO4 Ivan Sarak, the Deputy Defense Attaché. Tall and imposing, Warrant Officer Sarak exemplifies the talent with is resident within the Army. A Special forces solider since the Vietnam era, Sarak is a naturalized citizen and fluent in the Croatian language. His expertise was a major asset in maintaining the excellent relations between the new military establishment of Croatia and the United State. Coinciding with the visit of the SSCI delegation was a large group of Professional Staff from the Senate Armed Services Committee. The Defense Attache (DATT), Lt . Col. Richard Herrick, was supporting that delegation traveling en route the site of some fierce fighting in the secession of Croatia from the FRY. Mr. Dorn and Mr. Reese were able to link up with this large group which proceeded into the countryside to examine the border, meet with military officials and visit some of the ruined buildings in the village. The local graveyard is full of victims of the fighting; the site is maintained as a sort of shrine to the Croats martyred by the Serbs. The sense of immediacy of the conflict still hangs over the Capital. Although it had been the previous November when the last rocket was fired at Zagreb, there are still large numbers of long-term refugees housed in apartment complexes between the airport and the city. Violence has had a long association with Zagreb. After the fall of the Roman Empire, the land was conquered in turn by the Visigoths, the Alans, the Huns and the Avars. The Croats themselves arrived from the Slavic lands to the northwest, displacing the indigenous residents. Founded in 1094, part of old Zagreb was destroyed by the Tartars in the 13th Century, menaced by the Turks in the 16th, burned in the 18th, rocked by earthquake in the 19th, and occupied by the Nazis in the 20th. Still for all the pain, the city retains the somewhat shopworn elegance of the Habsburg Empire. The city is human scale, and the many church spires still punctuate the skyline. The twin spires of the cathedral dominate the foothills where the old city still huddles against the heights for security. Parts of this story were conveyed during a joint dinner that night for members of both Senate delegations, hosted by the Defense Attaché. Croatian cuisine is oriented toward grilled meats and bread and the locally-brewed grain-based beverages are very good. After the dinner, Lt Col Herrick took members on a walking tour of the old city. There is a religious shrine at the Kamenita Gate to the old district of Gornji Grad, where the Virgin Mary miraculously stopped a fire threatening to destroy the town. As a special place, the people of the town often prayed for similar divine intervention there. The DATT pointed out where Tito’s Secret Police lowered secret microphones to record the prayers for evidence of disloyalty.
47. MEETINGS WITH EMBASSY STAFF. SSCI Staffers were looking for an updated JWICS funding strategy to consistently addresses current/future intelligence requirements and whether those requirements should be GDIP or TIARA or other program funded. The JAC is a winner! Intelligence is improving, despite the pressures. Ironic as it may seem, by the end of the extensive Sixth Fleet discussions on Rota, VADM Prueher seemed resigned to moving most of Rota to the JAC (with MOU assurances) and Mr Dorn seemed open to retain the Fosif in Rota, either as a JAC Detachment, or as a Navy Program 2 intelligence command. The bottom line being that the issue has been examined/debated for three years and action must be taken soon.
There appears to be a very real attempt by the State Department officials at Zagreb and Rome to prevent Military and Agency intelligence personnel from collecting either overtly or undercover any intelligence/information on the Balkans crisis, thereby allowing the State Department political position on the Balkans to stand.
Questions or request for clarification may be addressed to the author at Autovon 322-7122.
Vic Socotra
Copyright 2014 Vic Socotra
www.vicsocotra.com
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